BLOCKING ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION UNDER THE NEW PERSONAL
PRIVACY RULE
Ericj Sinrod*
I.

INTRODUCrION

This Article addresses a categorical rule proposed by the Department of Justice and adopted by several Circuit Courts of Appeal, which effectively emasculates the ability to obtain critical
information under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").'
This categorical rule defeats the pro-disclosure statutory language
and the legislative and case history of the FOIA.
The FOIA mandates that federal agencies "shall make" government information "available to the public."' FOIA Exemption 6
allows federal agencies to withhold "personnel and medical files
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' Courts balance privacy
invasions against public disclosure interests under Exemption 6 to
determine whether requested information should be disclosed.
Historically, courts have employed what has been termed "derivative use" analysis in weighing Exemption 6 privacy and public interests. Derivative use analysis ascertains how requested information
will be used and whether that use will cause invasions of privacy,
serve public interests, or both.
The Department of Justice, with increasing success in recent
appellate cases,4 has urged the adoption of a categorical rule under
Exemption 6 barring derivative consideration of public interests
that are not revealed within the four corners of a requested document. Indeed, the Solicitor General made this specific argument
in the most recent Exemption 6 case before the Supreme Court,
which involved a request for the names of Haitian "boat people"
* Partner in the San Francisco office of Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft. J.D., Uni-

versity of Michigan School of Law (1984); B.A., Oberlin College (1980). Mr. Sinrod
was co-counsel for the respondents in the recent Supreme Court case, United States
Department of State v. Ray, discussed in this Article.
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2 Id. § 552(a).
3 Id. § 552(b)(6).

4 See, e.g., Reed v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hopkins v. Department
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1991).
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who had been deported from the United States back to Haiti. 5
The Court decided that case on other grounds and therefore declined to rule on this issue for now.
As set forth in this Article, the courts should not adopt this
categorical rule because it eviscerates the public's ability to know
about, monitor and correct government misconduct. Often, a particular requested document does not reveal the full nature of government action. Rather, the information contained in that
document may be a necessary link to additional information that
exposes government misconduct or corruption.
II.

THE PURPOSE OF THE

FOIA AND THE GOVERNMENT'S BURDEN

To understand fully the rationale behind derivative use analysis, the FOIA's purpose of broad disclosure and the government's
heavy burden to justify withholding under Exemption 6 should be
examined.
A.

The Purpose of the FOIA Is to Ensure an Informed Citizenry

The Supreme Court on numerous occasions has enunciated
the basic philosophy of broad disclosure under FOIA, as summarized in John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.:6
This Court repeatedly has stressed the fundamental principle of
public access to Government documents that animates the
FOIA. "Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks
to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create ajudicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly
unwilling official hands." The Act's "basic purpose reflected 'a
general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information
is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.'"
"The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry,
vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check
against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
governed."7
In keeping with the philosophy of broad disclosure, federal agencies bear the burden of justifying their decisions to withhold re5 See United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. CL 541 (1991).

6 493 U.S. 146 (1989).
7 Id. at 151-52 (citations omitted). See also Department ofJustice v. Tax Analysts,
492 U.S. 136, 141-43 (1989); Department ofJustice v. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S.
749, 754-55 (1989); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-362 (1976);
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973).
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quested information.' The pertinent Senate Report reads:
Placing the burden of proof upon the agency puts the task of
justifying withholding on the only party able to explain it. The
private party can hardly be asked to prove that an agency has
improperly withheld public information because he will not
know the reasons for the agency action. 9
The Senate Report emphasizes that:
It is the purpose of the present bill.., to establish a generalphilosophy of

full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under
clearly delineated statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the press may obtain information
wrongfully withheld. It is important and necessary that the present void be filled. 10
The Senate Report's "Purpose of Bill" section quotes from James
Madison: "Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people
who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the
power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a
tragedy or perhaps both."1 1
With respect to Exemption 6 balancing, the Senate Report states
that "[s]uccess lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the
fullest responsible disclosure."' 2
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
9 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965). See also JohnDoe Agency, 493 U.S.
at 152; Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 663 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In
John Doe Agency, the Supreme Court noted that:
There are, to be sure, specific exemptions from disclosure set forth in
the Act. 'But these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy
that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of The Act.' ...
Accordingly, these exemptions 'must be narrowly construed.' Furthermore, 'the burden is on the agency to sustain its actions.'
493 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted).
Likewise, the Exxon court stated:
In Freedom of Information Act cases,... the agency claiming an exemption from the duty to disclose information has the burden of proof
and the district court should apply that burden with the knowledge that
the plaintiff is at a distinct disadvantage in attempting to test the claims
alleged by the agency.
663 F.2d at 126.
10 S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9, at 3 (emphasis added). See also Arieff v. Department of Navy, 712 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Providing information 'material
for monitoring the Government's activities' is the 'core purpose' of the FOTA.").
11 S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9, at 2-3.
12 Id. at 3. The language of FOIA has been interpreted by the Retired ChiefJudge
of the Third Circuit as mandating the Department of Justice to encourage agency
compliance with the FOLA. SeeJohnJ. Gibbons, The Court's Role in InterbranchDisputes
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The Government's Heavy Burden Under Exemption 6

Exemption 6 protects "personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.""3 At the House and Senate committee hearings on the bill, 14 representatives of the various government agencies urged that the words "clearly unwarranted," or at
least the word "clearly," be deleted from the bill so that au invasions of privacy could be prevented. 5 The federal government objected to its "heavy burden" under the clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy standard. 6 Congress, however, refused to delete this language, which it considered critical in limiting the scope
of Exemption 6.1' By retaining these words despite these repeated
agency efforts, Congress rejected an approach that would have
guaranteed blanket protection for all potential privacy invasions.
The use of the words "clearly unwarranted," therefore, was "a considered and significant determination."'" The requirement of Exemption 6 that disclosure be "clearly unwarranted" instructs the
courts to "tilt the balance" of privacy and disclosure interests "in
favor of disclosure."' 9 Thus, "under Exemption 6, the presumpOver Oversight of Agency Rulemaking, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 957, 989 (1993) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 552(d)).
13 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1988). The application of Exemption 6 is not limited to
files containing "intimate details" and "highly personal" information, and has been
expanded beyond a plain reading of "personal and medical and similar files." The
application of Exemption 6 includes practically any government information the revelation of which possibly could lead to an invasion of privacy. Department of State v.
Washington Post, 465 U.S. 595 (1982).
14 See, e.g., Federal Public Records Law: Hearings on H.R. 5012-21, H.R. 5237, H.R.
5406, H.R.5520, H.R. 5583, H.R. 6172,H.R 6739, H.R 7010, H.R. 7161 Before a Subcomm. on the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter
1965 House Hearings];AdministrativeProcedureAct: Hearings on S. 1160, S.1136, S. 1758,
and S. 1879 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciay, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings];
Freedom of Information Act: Hearingson S. 1666 and S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963).
15 See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 36 (1965) (testimony of Edward
Rains, Assistant General Counsel, Treasury Department); id. at 491 (testimony of William Feldesman, NLRB Solicitor); 1965 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 56 (1965)
(testimony of Fred. B. Smith, Acting General Counsel, Treasury Department); id. at
151 (testimony of Clark R. Mollenhoff, Vice Chairman, Sigma Delta Chi Committee
for Advancement of Freedom of Information); id. at 257 (testimony of William
Feldesman, NLRB Solicitor).
16 Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 378 n.16 (1976).
17 S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9, at 9; H. R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1966).
18 Rose, 425 U.S. at 378 n.16.
19 Washington Post Co. v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252,
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tion in favor of disclosure is as strong as can be found anywhere in
the Act."20 Not surprisingly then, "[t]he legislative history is clear
that Exemption 6 [is] directed at threats to privacy interests more
palpable than mere possibilities . . . [and] . . .does not protect
2
against disclosure of every incidental invasion of privacy."
The Supreme Court, in comparing Exemption 6 to Exemption
7(C), further confirmed that the policy of disclosure is stronger
under Exemption 6 than anywhere else in FOIA.2 2 In Departmentof
Justice v. Reporters Committee, the Court observed that:
Exemption 7(C)'s privacy language is broader than the comparable language in Exemption 6 in two respects. First, whereas
Exemption 6 requires that the invasion of privacy be "clearly unwarranted," the adverb "clearly" is omitted from Exemption
7(C). This omission is the product of a 1974 amendment
adopted in response to concerns expressed by the President.
Second, whereas Exemption 6 refers to disclosures that "would
constitute" an invasion of privacy, Exemption 7(C) encompasses
any disclosure that "could reasonably be expected to constitute"
such an invasion. This difference is also the product of a specific amendment. Thus, the standard for evaluating threatened
invasion of privacy interests resulting from the disclosure of
records compiled for law enforcement purposes is somewhat
broader than the
standard applicable to personnel, medical,
23
and similar files.
261 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
See also Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d
670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Inc. v. Hodel, 680 F.
Supp. 37, 39 (D.D.C. 1988); Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. Department of Agric., 602 F.
Supp. 534, 538 (D.D.C. 1984).
20 Washington Pos 690 F.2d at 261. See also Kurzon v. Department of Health and
Human Servs., 649 F.2d 65, 67 (1st Cir. 1981) ("By restricting the reach of exemption
6 to cases where the invasion of privacy caused by disclosure is not only unwarranted
but clearly so, Congress has erected an imposing barrier to nondisclosure under this
exemption"; withholding is a "rare case" when "the calculus unequivocally supports
withholding ... because Congress has weighted the balance so heavily in favor of
disclosure").
21 Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380 n.19, 382 (1976).
22 United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749 (1989). Exemption 7(C) prevents disclosure of "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that production of such law enforcement
records or information ... could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
23 Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 756 (footnotes omitted). See also FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 629 n.13 (1982) ("The distinction [between Exemptions 6 and 7] is
meaningful."); Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1989); Fund
For Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives and Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 862
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Powell v. Department ofJustice, 584 F. Supp. 1508, 1528 (N.D. Cal.
1984) ("Exemption 6 is a more narrow exemption"); Congressional News Syndicate v.

1993]

BLOCKING GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
III.

TRADITIONAL EXEMPTION

6

219

BALANCING

Under traditional Exception 6 balancing, privacy interests are
examined first, and if a significant privacy invasion is raised, then
the public interests in the requested information are considered.
Derivative use analysis traditionally is employed on either or both
sides of the balance when necessary.
A.

Privacy Invasions Are Examined Fully First

Because the core philosophy of FOIA is that of disclosure,
traditional Exemption 6 balancing first requires an inquiry into
whether a FOIA request implicates a substantial invasion of personal privacy. Then, only if such an invasion is implicated, the next
step is to evaluate the public interests that may be served by disclosure of the requested information.2 4 "If no significant privacy interest is implicated," the inquiry ends and "FOIA demands
Most courts undertaking traditional Exemption 6
disclosure." 5
allow
for derivative consideration of privacy invasions.2 6
balancing
Department ofJustice, 438 F. Supp. 538, 541 (D.D.C. 1977). As the court in Congressional News Syndicate recognized:
The difference in breadth [between Exemptions 6 and 7] is attributable
to the inherent distinction between investigatory files and personnel,
medical and similar files: that an individual's name appears in files of
the latter kind, without more, will probably not engender comment and
speculation, while, as the Government argues here, an individual whose
name surfaces in connection with an investigation may, without more,
become the subject of rumor and innuendo.
Id.
24 National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C.
denied, 110 S. CL 1805 (1990).
Cir. 1989), cert.
25 Id. (citing Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 109 S. Ct. 2841, 2850-53
(1989)). See also Halloran, 874 F.2d at 319; Ripskis v. Dep't of Housing and Urban
Dev., 746 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Washington Post Co. v. Department of Health &
Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Campbell v. Civil Service Comm'n,
539 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1976); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136 (3d
Cir. 1974); Rural Hous. Alliance v. Department of Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
26 See, e.g., NationalAssoc. of Retired Fed. Employees, 879 F.2d at 878 ("Where there is a
substantial probability that disclosure will cause an interference with personal privacy,
it matters not that there may be two or three links in the causal chain."); Hudson v.
Department of Army, Civil No. 86-1114, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 1987) (protecting personal information on the basis that disclosure ultimately could lead to physical
harm), aft'd, 926 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hemenway v. Hughes, 601 F. Supp. 1002,
1006-07 (D.D.C. 1985).
A small minority of relatively early cases, however, suggested that the threshold
production of documents alone must constitute the clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy under Exemption 6. For example, then-CircuitJudge Scalia believed
that "[a]ccording to the statute, it is the very 'production' of the documents which
must 'constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.' " Arieff v. De-
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The Full Extent of Public Interests Are Examined Next

Under traditional Exemption 6 balancing, courts examine
public interests after a significant privacy concern has been identified. This examination frequently involves derivative use analysis
of public interests. For example, courts routinely order the disclosure of names or other identifying details contained in government
files if public interests would be served by the requester's use of the
disclosed names or details and the public interests outweigh pri2
vacy concerns.

7

partment of Navy, 712 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (6)). See also Disabled Officer's Ass'n v. Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. 454, 457-58
(D.D.C. 1977).
27 See, e.g., Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d 949, 956 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985) (disclosure of identifying details and disciplinary information on military officer accused of
alleged improprieties); Arieff, 712 F.2d 1462 (disclosure of information possibly identifying individuals as taking particular drugs for particular diseases); Kurzon v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 649 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1981) (disclosure of names
and addresses of unsuccessful applicants for research grants from the National Cancer Institute); Columbia Packing Co., Inc. v. U.S. Department of Agric., 563 F.2d 495
(1st Cir. 1977) (disclosure of personnel records of two former federal meat inspectors
who were convicted of taking bribes). See also Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 170
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (disclosure of names and addresses contained in customs declaration
forms "would result in less than a substantial invasion of privacy"); Painting Indus. of
Hawaii Mkt. Recovery Fund v. Department of Air Force, 756 F. Supp. 452 (D. Hawaii
1990) (disclosure of names, addresses, phone numbers and social security numbers of
employees referred to in payroll records); National Ass'n of Atomic Veterans, Inc. v.
Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, 583 F. Supp. 1483 (D.D.C. 1984) (disclosure of
names and addresses of present and former military service members who participated in an atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program); Norwood v. FAA, 580 F.
Supp. 994 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) (disclosure of the identities of former air traffic controllers who had been terminated); National W. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 512 F.
Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (disclosure of the names and duty stations of employees
of the United States Postal Service employed in two cities); Disabled Officer's Ass'n,
428 F. Supp. 454 (disclosure of names and addresses of retired disabled military flight
officers); Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Department of'Justice, 405 F. Supp. 8 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (disclosure of the names of persons who wrote letters recommending parole for a particular prisoner).
The following cases are examples of name and address disclosure in the labor
context under Exemption 6: FLRA v. Department of Navy, 958 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir.
1992) (disclosure by federal agencies of their employees' home addresses to the unions that were the exclusive representatives of the employees' bargaining units); International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 5 v. HUD, 852 F.2d 87 (3d
Cir. 1988) (disclosure of payroll records including employees' names, addresses, and
social security numbers); Department of Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.) (disclosure of names and addresses of bargaining unit members), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S.
880 (1988); Department of Air Force v. FLRA, 838 F.2d 229 (7th Cir.) (disclosure of
home addresses of employees to union), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); Department of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987) (disclosure of
names and addresses of bargaining unit employees), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 880
(1988); American Fed. of Gov't Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.
1986) (disclosure of employee addresses to union); International Brotherhood of
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IV.

THE CATEGORICAL RULE BARRING DERIVATIVE USE ANALYSIS
PROPOSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

After the Supreme Court's decision in Department ofJustice v.
Reporters Committee,2 8 the Department of Justice has sought a categorical rule barring derivative use analysis of public interests under
Exemption 6.
A.

Reporters Committee and Its Progeny

Reporters Committee involved FOIA requests from the news media for access to any criminal history records, also known as "rap
sheets," maintained by the FBI on certain persons alleged to have
participated in organized crime and engaged in improper dealings
with a corrupt congressman. By holding that rap sheets are entitled to protection under Exemption 7(C), the Supreme Court established the proposition that agencies may engage in "categorical
balancing" in favor of nondisclosure. 9
Under this new approach, which was not even requested by
the Solicitor General, it may be determined "as a categorical matter" that a certain type of information always is protected under an
exemption "without regard to individual circumstances."3 0 With
respect to privacy considerations, the Court stressed that "both the
common law and the literal understanding of privacy encompass
the individual's control of information concerning his or her person."3 1 The Court thus found a "significant privacy interest" in the
nondisclosure of records of a private citizen's criminal history,
"even where the information may have been at one time public." 2
With respect to public interest considerations, the Court stated that
the purpose of FOIA was to "shed[ ] light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties"3" and information, such as a rap sheet,
which does not "directly" reveal the activities of the government,
"falls outside of the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was
enacted to serve."3 4
Since Reporters Committee, the Department of Justice has seized
Elec. Workers Local 41 v. HUD, 763 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (disclosure of names of
employees listed on payrolls); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (disclo-

sure of names and addresses of employees eligible to vote in certain elections).
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

489 U.S. 749 (1989).

Id. at 776-80 & 777 n.22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

780.
763.
767.
773.
773, 775.
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on the Supreme Court's language in that decision and has urged
the courts, as a categorical matter, to disallow derivative use analysis on the public interest side of Exemption 6 balancing.-5 The
Department of Justice has argued that such an analysis does not
focus properly on what public interests are revealed "directly" by
the requested documents. This argument has been successful in
recent appellate cases and a trend is emerging. 6
In Reed v. NLRBI the D.C. Circuit recently ruled that Excelsior lists containing the names and addresses of employees eligible
to vote in representation elections should not be disclosed under
Exemption 6 to a FOIA requester who planned to use the lists to
correct alleged misrepresentations made by the NLRB to employees. The Reed court held that the information requested was "exclusively private" and that the requester's purpose was
"irrelevant.""8
The Second Circuit, in Hopkins v. Department of Housing and
UrbanDevelopment, 9 recently ruled under Exemption 6 that "disclo35 Ironically, the government previously relied on derivative use analysis to justify
withholding information for past FOIA requests. See Fund for Constitutional Gov't v.
Nat'l Archives, 656 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (access to records of Watergate Special
Prosecution Force (WSPF) denied under Exemption 7(C) where the government
contended that revelation of the information gathered by the WSPF was not in the
public interest and would force investigated individuals to defend their conduct despite never being prosecuted); Columbia Packing Co., Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 563 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1977) (a meat packing company, investigated for bribing
two federal meat inspectors, was denied access to records of meat inspectors' individual careers, family relations, and financial and medical records under Exemption 6
where government claimed release was not in the public interest and would violate
inspectors' privacy); Congressional News Syndicate v. Department of Justice, 483 F.
Supp. 583 (D.D.C. 1977) (government contended that the release of information on
recipients and donors of campaign funds in connection with the "Townhouse Operation" of the Watergate scandal were exempt under Exemption 7(C) because the release of information was not in the public interest and the "aura of Watergate" was
such that release of individuals' names connected with the Watergate investigation
would result in "an implication of criminality and political corruption").
36 A recent district court decision, however, counters this current appellate trend.
See International Diatomite Producers Assn. v. Social Sec. Admin., No. C-92-1634-CAL,
1993 WL 13728 (N.D. Cal. April 28, 1993) (applying derivative use analysis for public
interest side of Exemption 6 balancing where requester sought Social Security numbers, individual benefits, claims, and reports of income of workers in diatomite industry to determine if the government agencies were protecting the workers).
37 927 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
38 Id. at 1251-52. One district court decision has followed the direction of the Reed
court. See Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 809 F.
Supp. 148 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that there was insufficient public interest in the
disclosure to consumer groups of the names and addresses of individuals who complained to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration about auto safety
problems where the complainants had strong privacy interests).
39 929 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1991).
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sure of information affecting privacy interests is permissible only if
the information reveals something directly about the character of a
government agency or official."' 0
The Second Circuit,41 the Seventh Circuit 42 and the Eleventh
Circuit43 have held that the disclosure of names and addresses of
government employees to unions which represent them is categorically barred under Exemption 6. For example, in FLRA v. Department of Defense," the Eleventh Circuit held that the names and
addresses of the employees, in isolation, "say nothing about a federal agency's character or function, [and therefore] under Reporters
Committee, the public interest side of the balance here carries little
weight."45
B. Department of Justice v. Landano
In the most recent Supreme Court FOIA case, Department of

Justice v. Landano,4 6 the Court addressed whether FOIA mandated a
categorical presumption that all sources supplying information to
the FBI in the course of a criminal investigation are confidential
sources and, thus, exempt from disclosure under Exemption
7(D). 47
Landano concerned FOIA requests for information the FBI
had compiled in the course of its investigation of a police officer's
murder. The Department of Justice contended that the Court's
prior FOIA decisions "make it clear that where a generic 'categorical' showing is legally sufficient to establish the applicability of an
exemption, the FOIA imposes no requirement of individualized
Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
See FLRA v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 958 F.2d 503, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1992).
See Department of Navy v. FLRA, 975 F.2d 348, 355 (7th Cir. 1992).
43 See FLRA v. Department of Defense, 977 F.2d 545, 548 (11th Cir. 1992).
44 Id.
45 Id. (footnote omitted). The categorical rule continues to be adopted in Exemption 7(C) cases. See, e.g., Landano v. Department of Justice, 956 F.2d 422, 430 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 197 (1992) (under Exemption 7(C), inmate not entitled
to the names of persons who were interviewed as part of his criminal investigation
because those names did not reflect "directly" on agency conduct); Safecard Servs.,
Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("We now hold categorically that,
unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files
within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is
exempt from disclosure.").
46 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993).
47 Exemption 7(D) prevents disclosure of "records of information compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law
enforcement records or information. . . could reasonably be expected to disclose the
identity of a confidential source." 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (7) (D) (1988).
40
41
42

224

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:214

proofs."4" The Department ofJustice also argued that there was an

"inherently implicit" assurance of confidentiality when a source
contributes information to an FBI investigation, thereby mandating a categorical presumption that all sources contributing to an
FBI investigation are confidential and protected under Exemption
7(D).9
While the Court in Landano did not give the Department of

Justice the "universal" categorical presumption it desired, the
Court nevertheless did allow significant categorical government
withholding under Exemption 7(D) with little showing. If the

character of the crime and the relationship of the witness to the
FBI are sufficient to determine that the source cooperated with an
implied assurance of confidentiality, then a categorical presumption under Exemption 7(D) is warranted." Landano thus adds
some support to the judicial trend embracing categorical rules bar-

ring access to government information.51
C. United States Department of State v. Ray

The most recent Supreme Court case to address Exemption 6
is United States Department of State v. Ray. 2 In Ray, the Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether certain FOIA requesters-an
immigration attorney and certain political asylum applicants-

were entitled to the names of certain Haitian "boat people" who
had been denied political asylum in the United States and had
48 Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, Department of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014
(1993) (No. 91-2054). See also Petitioner's Brief at 23-24 n.17, Department ofJustice
v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993) (No. 91-2054) [hereinafter Landano Petitioner's
Brief].
49 Such a presumption would effectively eliminate access to any government documents that are "confidential," as there would be no way for a requester to gain access
to information to rebut the presumption of confidentiality. Landano, 113 S. Ct. at
2021.
50 Id. Perhaps equally important is the revelation by the Department of Justice
that the agency views "individualized, source by source showings" for government exemptions under FOIA as "nothing other than ajudicially engrafted addition to [FOIA]
itself." Landano Petitioner's Brief, supra note 48, at 24.
51 Pursuant to the direction of the Landano Court, the Second Circuit modified its
prior categorical presumption barring access to law enforcement records under Exemption 7(D) and instructed a district court to reconsider its decision barring access
to government information relating to a murder. Oliva v. Department ofJustice, 996
F.2d 1475 (2d Cir. 1993). In Oliva, the Second Circuit stated that the Landano decision rejected "adminstrative practicality" for "a more particularized analysis to determine whether or not documents should be exempt under 7(D)." Id. at 1477.
Whether the Second Circuit will also follow Landano'sdirection allowing for categorical presumptions where the character of the crime and the witness's relation to it are
sufficient to infer confidentiality is unclear at this time.
52 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991).
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been deported back to Haiti. The State Department had stated
publicly that its personnel had gone to Haiti and interviewed several hundred returned Haitians ("returnees"), none of whom, according to the State Department, claimed that they had been
persecuted after their return. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service, in later Haitian political asylum hearings, cited these interviews as evidence that returnees are not harmed on return to Haiti
and on that basis deported other Haitians. The FOIA requesters
sought the names of the returnees contained in the interview reports so that they could be located and contacted. The requesters
wanted to contact the returnees to determine whether United
States officials were accurate in stating that the returnees had not
been persecuted, for the purpose of ascertaining whether United
States officials were monitoring properly Haiti's compliance with a
treaty not to persecute the returnees, and to ensure fair and consistent political asylum proceedings in the United States.5 3
The Solicitor General argued in Ray that any derivative inquiry
into the public interests for the names of the returnees should be
rejected. Specifically, the Solicitor General maintained that under
the Reporters Committee analysis, the public interest in obtaining information under Exemption 6 must be revealed "directly" by the
documents themselves. The Supreme Court characterized the Solicitor General's argument as follows: The "'derivative use' of requested documents is entirely beyond the purpose of the statute
and... we should adopt a categorical rule entirely excluding the
interest in such use from the process of balancing the public interest in disclosure against the interest in privacy. " "
In a decision authored by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court
declined consideration of such a categorical rule, at least for the
time being, because in the view of the Court:
There is no need to adopt such a rigid rule to decide this case
... because there is nothing in the record to suggest that a second series of interviews with the already-interviewed returnees
would produce any relevant information that is not set forth in
the documents that have already been produced. Mere speculation about hypothetical public benefits cannot outweigh a demonstrably significant invasion of privacy. Accordingly, we need
not address the question whether a "derivative use" theory
would ever justify release of information about private
53 Respondents' Brief, at 30-36, United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541
(1991) (No. 90-747).
54 Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 549.
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individuals.5 5
The Ray Court nevertheless made a derivative inquiry into potential invasions of privacy resulting from further interviews of the returnees. The Court looked beyond the contents of the interview reports
and noted that the disclosure of the returnees' names could subject
them or their families to "embarrassment in their social and community relationships" because the returnees could be identified as persons who cooperated with the State Department.5 6 The Court further
noted that there was a "danger of mistreatment" and a possibility of
"retaliatory action" against returnees should their names be disclosed.5 7 The interview reports in and of themselves did not address
the possibility of embarrassment, danger or retaliatory action. Rather,
the Court made a derivative examination of State Department declarations filed in the FOIA lawsuit to come to its conclusion that "significant" privacy interests were at stake.5
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Ray, joined by Justice Kennedy, highlights the inconsistency of the majority opinion:
The Court today pointedly abstains from deciding the derivative-use issue .... I am content with that. It seems to me, however, that since derivative use on the public-benefits side, and
derivative use on the personal-privacy side must surely go together (there is no plausible reason to allow it for the one and
bar it for the other) the Court should have been consistent in its
abstention. It should not.., have discussed such matters as the
"retaliatory action that might result from renewed interest in
[the interviewees'] aborted attempt to emigrate," and "the fact
that respondents plan to make direct contact with the individual
Haitian returnees identified in the reports. " '
The concurring opinion concluded that the "majority does not.
refute the persuasive contention that consideration of derivative uses,
whether to establish a public interest or to establish an invasion of
privacy, is impermissible."'
Although the concurring opinion in Ray is correct that derivative
analysis on the privacy and public interest sides "must surely go together," the analysis should be permitted equally, rather than excluded on both sides, as set forth below.
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 549-50.

at 548.

at 551 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 548).
at 550 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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DERIVATIVE USE ANALYSIS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED ON BOTH
SIDES OF EXEMPTION 6 BALANCING

Derivative Use Analysis of Privacy Invasions

Given that the law commands disclosure if the government
demonstrates no substantial invasion of privacy under Exemption
6, a full and derivative inquiry of privacy interests is warranted.
Many times the production of documents itself will not constitute a
significant invasion of privacy, but the production will lead to other
acts or events that will substantially threaten privacy interests.
The Solicitor General inadvertently, but properly, urged the
Supreme Court in Ray to implement a derivative use analysis with
respect to invasions of privacy: "The purpose for which respondents seek this information adds further to the assault upon the
privacy values protected by the Act. Respondents seek these names
and addresses so that they can go to Haiti, track down the interviewed Haitian citizens and 'check what happened'....
The Ray Court, without expressly acknowledging the fact that
it was conducting a derivative examination of privacy interests, correctly studied what would be done with the names of the Haitian
returnees if this information was disclosed. The production of the
names alone did not constitute an invasion of privacy; however, the
fact that the FOIA requesters planned to interview the returnees
on the subject of persecution, once they learned the returnees'
names, raised privacy concerns. To ignore such derivative privacy
concerns could very well lead to the "clearly unwarranted invasions
of privacy" Exemption 6 was designed to prevent. Indeed, the principal sponsor of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA stated that "deletion of names and identifying characteristics of individuals would
"
in some cases serve the underlying purpose of Exemption 6. 62
The Ray Court perhaps gave undue weight to the derivative
privacy interests at stake. The feared invasion of privacy was that
the FOIA requesters would contact the Haitian returnees once
their names were disclosed and then would attempt to interview
the returnees about possible persecution in Haiti. Although such
interviews potentially could implicate privacy concerns, a phone
call, mail solicitation, or even a visit by the FOIA requesters could
be ignored or refused by the returnees like any other unwanted
61 Petitioner's Brief at 30, United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991)

(No. 90-747) [hereinafter Ray Petitioner's Brief].
62 Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 375 (quoting 120 CONG. REC.
17,018 (1974)).
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solicitation.6" Furthermore, such interviews attempted by private
citizens with no power over the returnees is less intrusive than the
behavior of the State Department in conducting essentially the
same interviews with the same individuals.
B. Derivative Use Analysis of Public Interests
1.

The Rationale

Derivative public interest examination under Exemption 6 is
critical because the Department of Justice's proposed categorical
rule, under the rubric of promoting administrative convenience,
contravenes the FOIA's pro-disclosure purposes.64 Although information released pursuant to a FOIA request sometimes may reveal
the full nature of government conduct, in far more cases it will not.
In those cases the information may be a necessary link to additional information, part of a larger puzzle where the pieces must be
carefully searched out and assembled. The end result often is the
exposure of government action, ineffectiveness or misconduct.
Yet, under the categorical rule, if a requested document must be
used to acquire other information about government conduct,
then it need not be disclosed. This outcome would lead to absurd
results. For example, if two sets of documents, read in conjunction, would uncover government misdeeds, but neither individually
established any conclusive wrongdoings, then pursuant to this rule
neither document should be produced.
The public interests in shedding light on official conduct depend primarily on what citizens know about official conduct, not
on how the knowledge is gained. If the requested information
could enable the public to gain such knowledge about government
conduct, the public has a cognizable FOIA interest in the release of
the information. The fundamental problem with the Department
of Justice's proposed categorical rule is that it asks the right question at the wrong point in the Exemption 6 analysis. The Department of Justice's concern is about how a release of information
would enable a FOIA requester to gain knowledge about official
63 See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781, 788-89
(1988); Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 477 (1988); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980).
64 The Supreme Court rejected administrative convenience as the sole basis to create an anti-disclosure presumption in Exemption 7(D) cases. See United States Dep't
of State v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993). The Second Circuit has followed the
Supreme Court's direction that Exemption 7(D) requires "a more particularized analysis." Oliva v. Department of Justice, 996 F.2d 1475, 1477 (2d Cir. 1993).
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conduct, not whether the release would enable the requester to
gain the knowledge. This concern is better addressed as a factor
affecting the privacy side of Exemption 6 balancing.
2.

Freedom of the Press

The press traditionally has used information in government
documents as a springboard to uncover additional information, to
direct questions to government officials, and to conduct follow-up
interviews with the individuals affected. The resulting articles on
how government carries out its functions have created public responses ranging from appreciation of government's successes to
demands to have abuses remedied. These articles serve the FOIA's
central purpose-to enable the public "to decide for itselfwhether
government action is proper. "65
A few examples of investigative journalism which have been
aided by derivative use of information obtained through freedom6
of information laws or other public sources are provided below:
9 After three military helicopters crashed in 1987 during
routine night flights in Orange County, California, one reporter
[for the Orange County Register] investigated the suspicious pattern. Military authorities initially maintained that there was no
common cause to the crashes, but the reporter's investigation
proved otherwise. After interviews established that all of the pilots who crashed had been wearing night-vision goggles, the reporter ...

made extensive FOIA requests for detailed accident

reports and military data. Using the names provided in those
reports, he interviewed families of crash victims, pilots, engineers and military officials to uncover the fact that obsolete
night-vision goggles had led to at least 56 crashes and 130 deaths
nationwide. In addition to winning a Pulitzer Prize, [his] series
led to a congressional investigation, new safety regulations
designed to6 ensure
the safety of military aviators, and improved
7
equipment.
e A... Pulitzer Prize-winning series [in the AtlantaJournal-

Constitution] uncovered the deaths of fifty-one children and the
abuse of countless others while under the "protection" of Geor65 Washington Post Co. v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252,

264 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
66 These examples and some of the First Amendment analysis that follows derive
from an Amici Curiae brief submitted by the law firm Nixon, Hargrave, Devans &
Doyle in Ray. See Brief Amici Curiae of American Newspaper Publishers Association et
al., United States Department of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991) (No. 90-747)
[hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae].
67 Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 66, at 22-23 (citing Humes, Death in the Dark,
ORANGE CouNtY REGIsrER,

Dec. 4, 7, 8, 1988).
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gia's child welfare system. The stories documented the utter
failure of the system to keep track of the children under its care,
many of whom lived in dangerous and appalling conditions and
suffered preventable deaths or serious physical and emotional
damage. Ironically, [the reporter of this series] found that longstanding confidentiality laws, ostensibly designed to protect the
privacy of children, forbade the release of information-even
about dead children-which could have saved them or others
from brutal beatings and death. As a direct result of the public
outcry following this series, Georgia appropriated several million dollars to reform its child welfare system, inquiries by prospective foster parents quadrupled, and volunteerism increased
at an overtaxed charity hospital caring for abused and drug-addicted babies and children.'
e Another Pulitzer Prize-winning report [in The Indianapolis
Star] exposed physicians in Indiana who had been found liable
for malpractice several times, yet continued to practice
medicine and were never disciplined by the responsible state
agency. The repeated malpractice of these doctors resulted in
dead as well as crippled and deformed patients who, due to Indiana's laws, were compensated for only a fraction of their subsequent medical costs.6 9
* [Reporters] of The Orlando Sentinel wrote a series in 1989
that explored the consequences of Florida's policy of relieving
prison overcrowding by releasing inmates back into society
before their sentences had expired. The reporters cross-referenced computerized prison records with publicly available criminal history records to disclose that nearly a third of those
inmates released early had committed new crimes while they still
would have been serving time for the old crimes, but for the
early release policy. If they had not been able to identify those
inmates released through the prison records, the reporters
never would have been able to show the impact of Florida's early
release policy. As a result of the series, 55 of Florida's 67 sheriffs
70
joined in a lawsuit challenging the early release policy.
The above articles succeeded because the reporters obtained
enough additional information to get behind the facts released by
government authorities. Without the ability to obtain names or other
identifying details from the government resulting from derivative use
68 Id. at 21-22 (citing Hansen, Suffer the Children, ATLANrAJOURNAL-CONsxrrtrlmON,
June 4-10, 1989).
69

Id. at 22 (citing Hallinan and Headen, A Case of Neglect: Medical Malpractice in

Indiana, THE INDIANAPoLis STAR, June 24-26, 1990 at 1).
70 Id. at 23 (citing Holton and Vosburgh, Crime Before Its Time, THE ORLANDo SzI-NEL.,Aug.

13-16, 1989).
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public interest analysis under Exemption 6, the press will present only
incomplete information to the public.

3. The Policies of the FOIA and the First Amendment
The relationship between the FOIA's policies and those of the
First Amendment also work against the Department of'Justice's categorical rule. The FOIA and the First Amendment both have as
their basic purpose the assurance of an "informed citizenry vital to
the functioning of a democratic society."71 The categorical rule
thwarts this purpose and creates an irrebuttable presumption of
nondisclosure.
The Supreme Court has rejected this course in the judicial ac-

cess area, holding that categorical privacy rules cannot overcome
the principle of openness. In Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court,'72
the Court recognized the importance of jurors' privacy rights, but
struck down a trial court's decision that closed voir dire proceedings to the public and press based upon a generalized notion that
those privacy rights overcame the value of openness. Similarly, in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,7" the Court discussed the privacy rights of child victims of sexual crimes, but held that those
interests could not justify a categorical rule denying access to criminal proceedings. Moreover, in Waller v. Georgia," the Court used a
Sixth Amendment rationale to strike down another impermissibly
broad rule of secrecy premised on privacy notions.
The Department of Justice's categorical rule suffers from the
same problem as the broad rules of secrecy struck down in the judicial access cases. The categorical rule leads to the restriction of the
free flow of information based upon generalized privacy concepts.
The Supreme Court has blocked this result in judicial access cases,
and the courts should do the same under Exemption 6, especially
in light of the FOIA's strong disclosure bias.
4.

The Solicitor General's Concerns

The Solicitor General in Ray raised several points in support of
the argument that a categorical rule should be established barring
any derivative inquiries into public interests for information under
71 FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982) (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978)).
72 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
73 457 U.S, 596 (1982).
74 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
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Exemption 6 balancing. Each of these points is addressed by traditional Exemption 6 balancing, as set forth below.
The Solicitor General first argued that the courts cannot look
to the "derivative use" for information because to do so would entitle each requester to omnibus access to all information: "All ... a
requester would be required to do is frame his request in terms of
a desire to contact the individuals involved and interview them as
part of an investigation into the accuracy of the government's
records and the fairness or effectiveness of the administration of
those governmental programs."7 5 Yet, under traditional Exemption 6 balancing, the courts are required first to analyze privacy
interests and then to weigh any such interests against public interests in disclosure. If significant privacy interests outweigh public
disclosure interests under derivative use analysis, withholding is
proper. The traditional balancing approach under Exemption 6
fully takes into account all interests.
The Solicitor General next argued in Ray that the "derivative
use" for information could not be considered under Exemption 6
because such an analysis was "flatly inconsistent with the holding in
Reporters Committee."7 6 Nonetheless, critical language from Reporters
Committee undercuts this argument:
In this case-and presumably in the typical case in which one
private citizen is seeking information about another-the requester does not intend to discover anything about the conduct
of the agency that has possession of the requested records. Indeed, response to this request would not shed any light on the
conduct of any Government agency or official.7 7
The Reporters Committee Court thus afforded the opportunity in certain
cases for disclosure of information concerning individuals under
traditional and complete derivative Exemption 6 balancing when that
information "sheds light" on government conduct.
The Solicitor General further argued in Ray that derivative inquiries of public interests are improper under Exemption 6 because
the courts may not look to the specific needs of FOIA requesters.7 8
The Solicitor General is correct that the courts should focus on the
greater public interests in disclosure under Exemption 6, rather than
looking exclusively to the FOIA requesters' interests in the information at issue. Nevertheless, the requesters are part of the public, and
75 Ray Petitioner's Brief, supra note 61, at 22.
76 Id. at 23.
77 Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989) (citation
omitted).
78 Ray Petitioner's Brief, supra note 61, at 25.
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their use for requested information should be included within the
framework of the public interests. 79
The Solicitor General finally suggested to the Ray Court that
"[ain approach that turns upon a proposed use for the government
records, rather than on the intrinsic informational value of the
records, would introduce unworkable speculation and complexity into
the application of Exemption 6. "s ° Yet, the "requirement that the
agency support its decision to withhold with reasonable authority
places a duty on the agency" to analyze many factors in sustaining its
burden."1 Moreover, it is by no means easier to determine the "intrinsic information value" of documents than the public interests supporting disclosure.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The courts should reject the categorical rule barring derivative
use analysis of public interests under Exemption 6. Exemption 6
balancing not only should take into account derivative use examination of invasions of privacy, but also derivative use analysis of
public disclosure interests.
79 See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1760 v. FLRA, 786 F.2d 554 (2d
Cir. 1986); Arieffv. Department of Navy, 712 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ditlow
v. Schultz, 517 F.2d 166, 172 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
80 Ray Petitioner's Brief, supra note 61, at 26.
81 See Local 598 v. Department of Army Corps of Eng'rs, 841 F.2d 1459, 1463 (9th

Cir. 1988).

